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The
Doolittle Raid: America on the Offensive
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"At 3:10 AM on April 18 the Enterprise's radar revealed two enemy
surface craft 21,000 yards off, and two minutes later a light appeared
on the same bearing."16 Since it
was still dark and Japanese vessels were for the most part without
radar, Halsey rightly assumed that the Japanese had not yet detected
the task force. To avoid the enemy ships, he turned the task force
due north until the two radar contacts disappeared. The westerly course
towards Japan was then resumed.
Unbeknownst to Halsey and the rest of the navy, the Japanese were
aware that an American task force of two or three carriers was steaming
in the Pacific. Accordingly, they had set up a hundred-mile deep screen
of small craft roughly 750 miles off the coast of Japan-and Task Force
16 had just run right into the middle of it. Though they had successfully
avoided the first encounter, and barely avoided a second just before
dawn, at around 6:00 AM, a message came back from one of Enterprise's
scout planes. "ENEMY SURFACE SHIP-LATITUDE 36-04N, LONG. 153-10E,
BEARING 276 DEGREES TRUE-42 MILES. BELIEVED SEEN BY ENEMY."17
The question of whether or not the bomber had been spotted became
moot when the task force itself spotted the vessel. Since it was now
light, and the Americans could see the Japanese, it was most likely
that the Japanese could also see the Americans. American fears were
confirmed when a burst of radio traffic suddenly filled the airwaves.
The Japanese had spotted them while they were still over 600 miles
from the coast of Japan, almost 200 miles short of the planned launch
point.
Halsey recognized the screen for what it was, and though they were
in no immediate danger, and surrounded by only smaller craft, he knew
that a Japanese response that would pose a severe threat to his task
force would be forthcoming. To avoid this threat, the Task Force had
to either launch Doolittle and his planes or turn and run for friendly
waters without launching the raid. In order to attempt to accomplish
the mission, and to protect the men and ships of the Task Force, Halsey
ordered the cruiser Nashville to sink the Japanese patrol ship, and
also ordered Doolittle and his fliers into the air.
The entire plan for the raid was now irrelevant. Doolittle would
now take off three minutes instead of three hours ahead of the rest
of the raid, and it would be a daylight raid, instead of a safer night
operation. More importantly, however, since they were still some 620
miles from the Japanese coast, and "there would not be enough fuel
to get them to the Asian mainland [let alone through Japanese-occupied
Manchuria to free China], so they would have to ditch in the East
China Sea."18
At approximately 8:20 in the morning (7:20 Tokyo time), Doolittle
took to the air in his B-25. After circling the ship to get his bearings
(the magnetic compasses in the planes had been skewed by prolonged
proximity to the metal of the Hornet, and could only be adjusted imprecisely
by this method), he proceeded westward toward Tokyo.19
All sixteen planes made safe takeoffs in the span of an hour behind
Doolittle, and after making the adjustment to their compasses, set
off individually towards Japan. Once the planes were off, the Hornet,
the Enterprise, and the rest of the Task Force turned eastward and
sailed full steam towards the destroyers and supply ships, and "Halsey
managed to retire with little difficulty, and both carriers [complete
with the rest of the Task Force] returned to Pearl Harbor on 25 April."20
The planes, though all slightly off course due to the quirks in
their on-board compasses, were all generally on course to hit their
respective targets. Though many of the planes passed over Japanese
ships, and even under Japanese planes, only a few were fired upon,
but all escaped significant damage. The planes all flew low and slow
to minimize fuel consumption, all the while concerned about the prospect
of bailing out over the East China Sea, or even worse, Japan itself.
To make matters worse, the planes encountered a headwind that impeded
their progress and made the fuel situation even graver. However, the
wind did clear up the weather, which allowed the pilots of the planes
to get accurate bearings for the first time. Many of them found themselves
significantly off course, and had to adjust accordingly.
Meanwhile, under an "amazing coincidence," Tokyo was in the midst
of a three-hour full-dress air-raid drill.21
Fighters flew combat air patrols over the city, anti-aircraft crews
were on full alert; every possible obstacle that could negatively
affect Doolittle's mission was not only present, but active. Strangely
enough, however, this wound up greatly aiding the American aviators
in their mission, for they arrived just on the tail end of the drill.
The fact that the planes arrived individually, from differing directions,
and in the waning moments of the air-raid drill led many Japanese
to the conclusion that the planes were part of the drill.
Certainly, a few of the Japanese anti-aircraft crews and fighter
pilots saw the attack for what it was, and took action to stop it,
but these occurrences were rare. Only two planes were attacked by
Japanese fighters-one was beset by two Japanese Zeros, one of which
it promptly shot down, causing the other Zero to flee. The second
plane was harangued by fighters for miles but eventually escaped.
So much extra fuel had been consumed, though, that they were forced
to ditch in the sea near the Japanese coast and were captured.22
For the most part, however, due to the air-raid drill, the myriad
of approaches the different planes took to their targets, and other
factors, most planes made their runs successfully. "An utterly bizarre
and circumstantial pattern, contrived by faulty instruments, hard
weather and human error, it turned miraculously into what seemed a
stroke of genius."23 Four of the
planes hit their primary targets, and of those that did not hit primary
targets, only two could not find their secondary targets. One of those
did manage to find a substitute military target, but the other was
forced to jettison its bombs over the ocean and run for China due
to severe engine problems.
All told, steel works, gas works, a chemical plant, a hospital,
fuel dumps, an aircraft factory, a tank factory, an electric company,
a shipyard, and an oil refinery were bombed to varying degrees of
effectiveness. The most unquestionable success came at the shipyard,
which was set ablaze, and where an aircraft carrier hull was struck
amidships by an demolition bomb, causing a great deal of damage. The
tank factory also suffered a great deal of damage, but otherwise,
the damage to the other targets ranged from slight to moderate.
After bombing their targets, the planes continued westward towards
China. The headwind that had impeded their progress luckily turned
into a twenty-five mile per hour tailwind that allowed all of the
planes but two to reach the mainland. The one crew that was forced
down into the sea was only a quarter mile off the Chinese coast, and
they survived only to be picked up by a Japanese patrol craft. The
other plane that did not reach China managed to reach the Soviet Union,
where the crew was interred for a number of months before being released.
For the planes that made landfall, the weather over China was,
in keeping with the rest of the mission, so poor that none of the
planes were able to land at Chinese airfields as planned. Instead,
they were all forced to bail out (many over Japanese occupied territory),
leading to three deaths (on bailout or crash landing), one severely
mangled leg which had to be amputated, and an assortment of minor
injures. Only one crew was unable to avoid capture in China-the rest
found their way to Chinese bases, eventually to India, and then back
to the United States.
Of the eight men captured by the Japanese, three were executed
for "war crimes," one died in prison, and the rest sat out the war
in a prisoner of war camp. In military terms, eight casualties and
the loss of sixteen medium bombers were well worth the effect that
the Doolittle Raid achieved. Though actual physical damage was slight,
the raid ended the five-century old myth that a "divine wind," or
kamikaze, protected Japan. "The Japanese people had been told they
were invulnerable. Their leaders had told them that Japan could never
be invaded."24
On the day of the Doolittle Raid, this belief was shattered. Not
shaken, but utterly and completely destroyed.
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At 1:30 PM, in the midst of an English propaganda broadcast from
Japan in which a woman (presumably 'Tokyo Rose') was telling how
safe Japan was from bombing, the broadcast was cut off and another
broadcast made giving information that fast, low-flying bombers
were at that time bombing Japan.25
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The humor of this statement was most certainly lost on the average
Japanese citizen, though its cruel irony was readily apparent. Conversely,
the news that "DOOLITTLE DID IT!" screamed on newspaper headlines
across the nation boosted American morale in a time of dire need.26
The raid indeed "had little impact on the military power of the
Japanese, but for its effects on the psychology of America and her
enemy in the Pacific, the Tokyo raid was a master stroke of offensive
action."27
Though the raid was intended mainly as a vengeance attack, and
a tool of psychological warfare, it did result in numerous military
dividends as well. First of all, the Japanese, wary of similar attacks
on the Home Islands, scrambled for more and better protection against
similar air attacks. Squadrons of fighters and anti-aircraft batteries
began flooding into Japan, and Tokyo in particular. Though these did
increase Japan's air defenses greatly, the weapons and men were drawn
off of the front lines elsewhere in the Pacific, "a move that Japan
could ill afford to make."28
Though the whittling of front-line forces to protect Japan itself
harmed the Japanese war effort, there was another result of the raid
that "'alone was worth the effort put into this operation by . . .
[those] . . . who had volunteered to help even the score.'"29
The Japanese at first had no real clue as to where the sixteen planes
had come from. They could not believe that the Americans had launched
Army bombers off of an aircraft carrier, and the imprisoned pilots
gave them wildly differing stories about the origin of the raid, ranging
from the Aleutians to Mongolia.
Further bewildering the Japanese attempts to discover the origin
of the raid, the complete secrecy surrounding the operation ensured
that the Japanese would not easily discover how the Americans had
carried out the raid. President Roosevelt's statement that the planes
had come from "Shangri-La" delighted the American public, and confounded
the Japanese even further. A short time later, of course, the Japanese
recognized the carrier attack for what is was.
This recognition, however, led to disaster for the Imperial Navy
and for Japan as well. All those formerly opposed to Yamamoto's plan
for the invasion of Midway, which the Japanese deduced had figured
prominently in the attack, quietly acquiesced to his wishes. Many
in the Navy who had once opposed the operation in fact suddenly "saw
the need" for the neutralization of Midway.
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If this kind of enemy attempt is to be neutralized, there would
be no other way but to make a landing on Hawaii. This makes landing
on Midway a prerequisite. This is the very reason why the Combined
Fleet urges a Midway operation.30
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In direct response to the Doolittle Raid, the invasion of Midway
was launched on June 4, 1942. In two days of fighting, the Japanese
lost four aircraft carriers, a heavy cruiser, two hundred and fifty
planes, and more than two thousand men. It was not only Japan's first
naval defeat since the sixteenth century and one of the most decisive
naval battles in history, it was the turning point of the war in the
Pacific. The battle, and the losses induced by it, "took place because
[the Doolittle] raid induced the Japanese to extend their forces beyond
capability."31
The Doolittle Raid stands even today as one of the most "audacious
and unorthodox" military operations in history.32
It also stands as one of the most successful, both from a psychological
and military standpoint. The shock and disbelief it cause in Japan when
it was realized that Japan was far from invulnerable, and the incredible
boost in morale for the Americans in their darkest hour were invaluable
contributions to the war effort. Though the initial military effect caused
by the bombers themselves was negligible, the overwhelming loss of life
and materiel suffered by the Japanese at Midway was an immeasurable contribution
to the defeat of Japan. The great psychological and military repercussions
caused by the Doolittle Raid make it clear that it was one of the most
daring and effective operations in World War II, and in all of history.
Endnotes
1Toland, John, The Rising Sun:
The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945, Volume 1,
New York: Random House, 1970, p. 380
2Hough, Col. Frank O., Ludwig, Maj.
Verle E., Shaw, Henry, Pearl Harbor to Gudalcanal: History of U.S.
Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Volume 1, Washington, D.C.,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958, p. 207
3Doolittle, James H. And Glines,
Carrol V., I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, New York: Bantam
Books, 1991, p. 237
4Ibid., p. 233
5Ibid., p. 229
6Ibid., p. 229
7Mondey, David, The Concise Guide
to American Aircraft of World War II, New York: Smithmark Publishers,
1996, pp. 110, 111, 180, 191
8Doolittle, James H. And Glines,
Carrol V., I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, New York: Bantam
Books, 1991, p. 3
9Ibid., pp. 240-242
10Ibid., p. 240
11Reader's Digest Illustrated
Story of World War II, Pleasantville, New York, The Reader's Digest
Association, 1978, p. 172 *no editor was listed for this book
12Doolittle, James H. And Glines,
Carrol V., I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, New York: Bantam
Books, 1991, p. 540
13Ibid., p. 262
14Reader's Digest Illustrated
Story of World War II, Pleasantville, New York, The Reader's Digest
Association, 1978, p. 172
15Doolittle, James H. And Glines,
Carrol V., I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, New York: Bantam
Books, 1991, p. 269
16Reader's Digest Illustrated
Story of World War II, Pleasantville, New York, The Reader's Digest
Association, 1978, p. 173
17Doolittle, James H. And Glines,
Carrol V., I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, New York: Bantam
Books, 1991, p. 274
18Reader's Digest Illustrated
Story of World War II, Pleasantville, New York, The Reader's Digest
Association, 1978, p. 173
19Doolittle, James H. And Glines,
Carrol V., I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, New York: Bantam
Books, 1991, p. 7
20Hough, Col. Frank O., Ludwig,
Maj. Verle E., Shaw, Henry, Pearl Harbor to Gudalcanal: History of
U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Volume 1, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958, p. 209
21Reader's Digest Illustrated
Story of World War II, Pleasantville, New York, The Reader's Digest
Association, 1978, p. 172
22Doolittle, James H. And Glines,
Carrol V., I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, New York: Bantam
Books, 1991, p. 550
23Reader's Digest Illustrated
Story of World War II, Pleasantville, New York, The Reader's Digest
Association, 1978, p. 173
24Doolittle, James H. And Glines,
Carrol V., I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, New York: Bantam
Books, 1991, p. 1
25Ibid., p. 285
26Toland, John, The Rising Sun:
The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945, Volume 1,
New York: Random House, 1970, p. 386
27Reader's Digest Illustrated
Story of World War II, Pleasantville, New York, The Reader's Digest
Association, 1978, p. 172
28Ibid., p. 177
29Hough, Col. Frank O., Ludwig,
Maj. Verle E., Shaw, Henry, Pearl Harbor to Gudalcanal: History of
U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Volume 1, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958, p. 209
30Prange, Gordon W., Miracle
at Midway, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982, p. 26
31Doolittle, James H. And Glines,
Carrol V., I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, New York: Bantam
Books, 1991, p. 293
32Hough, Col. Frank O., Ludwig,
Maj. Verle E., Shaw, Henry, Pearl Harbor to Gudalcanal: History of
U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, Volume 1, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958, p. 207
Bibliography
Doolittle, James H. And Glines, Carrol V., I Could Never Be So Lucky
Again, New York: Bantam Books, 1991
Pearl Harbor to Gudalcanal: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations
in World War II, Volume 1, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1958
Mondey, David, The Concise Guide to American Aircraft of World War
II, New York: Smithmark Publishers, 1996
Prange, Gordon W., Miracle at Midway, New York, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1982
Toland, John, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese
Empire 1936-1945, Volume 1, New York: Random House, 1970
Reader's Digest Illustrated Story of World War II, Pleasantville, New
York, The Reader's Digest Association, 1978
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Copyright
© 1994-2005 Stephen Payne
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