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The
Causes, Events, and Repurcussions of the Russo-Finnish War
Page 2
When the smoke finally cleared in 1944, Finland had lost over one-tenth
of her territory to Russia. In this ten percent was a great mass of population,
three major cities, and regions of great importance to the Finnish economy.
Even after losing these economic powerhouse regions, the Finns were still
expected to pay reparations to Russia totaling in excess of three hundred
million U.S. dollars. Firthermore, because of Finland’s stand against Russia, where
they utilized German aid, Finland was treated as one of the Axis countries
in post-war negotiations. Even though the Finns had fought against the
Germans as well as the Russians, they were literally raped by the demands
for reparations. Had the Allies not been so worried about appeasing the
Soviets, and instead thought about the fate of Finland, they might have
acted more judiciously. Luckily, Finland somehow pulled through against
the odds, and checked the Russian behemoth. The reparations were to be
paid in a variety of ways, including cash, commerce, and military goods,
at the rate of fifty million dollars per year, over a period of six years.
The reparations were to be divided up in the following manner:
machines and equipment, including installation of completely equipped
factories, $100.9 million; new vessels, $60.2 million; paper industry
products $59.0 million; wood industry products, $41.0 million; cable
products, $25.0 million; and ships surrendered from the existing
merchant marine, $13.9 million. 13 |
Unfortunately for Finland, they were forced to pay these outlandish
reparations with goods produced by a seriously weakened and debilitated
economy. Aside from the fact that their economy was in no shape
to meet the demands of the Russians, the Finns had more than that
stacked against them. The divisions in the methods of reparations
were in no way proportional to the economy of Finland. In fact,
the divisions were often in direct conflict with the production
percentages of the economy. For example, the wood industry accounted
for nearly ninety percent of Finland’s economy, but wooden goods
accounted for only thirteen percent of the reparation payments.
This gross misrepresentation can only be attributed to the Russian
desire for Finland to fail to meet the payments, which would allow
the Soviets to occupy Finland. The Finns, however, in another show
of ingenuity and bravado, refused to be beaten by the Russian reparations.
In an almost maniacal frenzy, they built their economy up from ruin,
without any outside aid. While they were technically a free nation,
Finland’s foreign policy was in fact greatly restricted because
of the Russian threat. Therefore, they were forced to refuse
any Marshall Plan aid. After being forced to jump start their economy,
Finland bolstered their economy and strengthened their overall
position. Once they paid off Russia, Finland’s economy was ready
to take an active part in both the European and world markets. They
did this in various ways. Along with Norway and Sweden, Finland
joined the EFTA (European Free Trade Agreement), which bonded Scandinavia
together economically. While this treaty was beneficial to all three
nations, the iron curtain still curtailed trade in the Baltic region,
which greatly hurt EFTA. Not until the fall of the Soviet Union
would the economies of the region really begin to move forward.
Overall, while the reparations placed stringent demands on Finland,
they were in the long run somewhat beneficiary. On the receiving
end, the Russians clearly benefited from the Finnish payments. The
industrial aid Russia received was greatly needed, because of the
lack of widespread modernization in the Soviet Union. The introduction
of modern industry to Russia spurred many changes, all for the better,
within the Russian economy. In addition, a new Soviet Socialist
Republic was formed out of the lands annexed from Finland. The Karelian
S.S.R. was headed by Otto Kuusinen, the former head of the Democratic
Republic of Finland puppet government.
There are many lessons to be learned from the events leading
up to, of, and in the wake of the Russo-Finnish war. If the Russians had
thought more clearly about the “security concerns” of Leningrad, they
might have seen that the city was as safe as it would ever be with
the borders where they were. Had the Finns tried to see things from
the viewpoint of the Russians, they may have been more understanding.
Instead, mistrust, deception, and misunderstandings dominated both sides in the negotiations.
Had clearheadedness prevailed, war could have been prevented, and
thousands of lives may have been spared. After the war, the Allies
certianly should have been less harsh in their dealings with Finland, and not
so paranoid in their dealings with Russia. While Finland did benefit
somewhat from their jump-started economy, the reparations were unnecessarily tough and hurt the Finnish economy. By
punishing Finland, the Allies implicitly threatened any nation that in the future
should attempt to survive by any means necessary. The Finns, however,
had the last laugh. The tiny country succeeded in stalemating one
of the greatest military powers on the planet, and retained and actually improved its position in the post-war world. This was such an incredible
accomplishment that in 1948, Josef Stalin himself stated, "Nobody
respects a country with a poor army, but everybody respects a country
with a good army. I raise my toast to the Finnish Army."
Endnotes
1 Tanner, Vaino The Winter War: Finland Against Russia
1939-1940 Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1957,
4
2 Ibid., p. 10
3 Ibid., p. 4
4 Ibid., p. 46
5 Schwartz, Andrew J. America and the Russo-Finnish War
Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1960, 15
6 Dallin, David J. Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy 1939-1942
Trans. by Leon Dennen. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Presses,
1942, 142
7 Ibid., p. 149
8 Ibid., p. 182
9 Ibid., p. 185
10 Ibid., p. 192
11 Ibid., p. 190
12 Ibid., p. 198
13 Jensen, Bartell C. The Impact of Reparations on the
Post-War Finnish Economy Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1966, 5
Bibliography
Dallin, David J. Soviet Russia’s Foreign Policy 1939-1942
Trans. by Leon Dennen. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Presses,
1942
Jakobsen, Max The Diplomacy of the Winter War Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961
Jensen, Bartell C. The Impact of Reparations on the Post-War
Finnish Economy Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1966
Schwartz, Andrew J. America and the Russo-Finnish War Washington,
D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1960
Tanner, Vaino The Winter War: Finland Against Russia 1939-1940
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1957
Trotter, William R. A Frozen Hell Chapel Hill, North Carolina:
Algonquin Books, 1991
Upton, Anthony F. Finland 1939-1940 Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated
University Presses, 1979
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Copyright
© 1994-2005 Stephen Payne
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