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The
Doolittle Raid: America on the Offensive
Endnotes and Bibliography located at
bottom of page 2
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese attack on the naval base at Pearl
Harbor thrust the United States into World War II. The attack, in
addition to severely crippling the United States Pacific fleet and
killing 2,403 servicemen and civilians, deeply wounded the American
psyche. The next six months remain amongst the darkest in American
history--Wake Island and Guam fell to the Japanese, the Philippines
had only the small force holding out on the island of Corregidor,
and American forces, and the nation as a whole, were in a state of
general defeat. For this reason, President Roosevelt ordered a "retaliatory"
strike at the heart of Japan, one that would serve both to inspire
the United States and demoralize Japan. The strike, while greatly
successful in its psychological aspect, proved to be a master stroke
in military terms as well.
In December of 1941, "shortly after Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt
had remarked that he would like to bomb the enemy mainland as soon
as possible to avenge in small part the 'sneak' attack."1
Though the attack would serve as more than mere vengeance, "the raid
was designed more for its dramatic impact upon morale than for any
other purpose."2 This vengeance
attack, however, seemed impossible because of the distances involved.
American land-based aircraft were all out of range of the Japanese
mainland, and an American carrier could never hope to get within striking
distance (roughly three hundred miles) of Japan before being attacked
by the formidable Japanese fleet. The President, seemingly indifferent
to the difficulties involved, remained adamant that a strike be launched
against Japan.
Roosevelt repeatedly pressured his military staff to come up with
a way to strike back at Japan. His staff, in turn, put their War Plans
Divisions to work on the problem. Many proposals were put forth by
the War Plans Divisions, such as using long range bombers based in
China to strike at Japan, that were all eventually discarded as infeasible
for one reason or another.3 In the
end, it was a submarine officer, Captain Francis S. Low, who formulated
the idea that would eventually be executed.
On January 10, 1942, Low timidly approached Admiral Ernest J. King
with an idea for a bombing strike against Japan. According to Low,
he had been at an airfield in Norfolk, Virginia where navy pilots
were trained. On the runway, there was an outline of a carrier deck
painted to facilitate the simulation of carrier takeoffs for the Navy
pilots-in-training. He also "'saw some Army twin-engine planes making
bombing passes at this simulated carrier deck. [He then] thought if
the Army has some twin-engine bombers with a range greater than our
fighters, it seems . . . a few of them could be loaded on a carrier
and used to bomb Japan.'"4
King was immediately intrigued by the idea, and shuttled it up
the chain of command for further investigation. In order for a mission
to be feasible, a plane that could take off in 500 feet of narrow
space not over 75 feet wide[carrier deck dimensions], carry a 2,000
pound bomb load, and fly 2,000 miles with a full crew" had to be found.5
Those specifications immediately dictated that the plane would "have
to be a medium bomber, because . . . heavy bombers could never get
off in 500 feet," and light bombers could never carry a 2,000 pound
bomb load 2,000 miles.6
In 1942, the United States had four medium bombers in production
- the Martin B-26, the North American B-25, and the Douglas B-18 and
B-23.7 Of these, only the B-23 and
B-25 could manage the takeoff, weight, and distance. But only the
North American B-25 had a wingspan compact enough to fit in the 75
foot "window" of a carrier deck. Even so, the B-25 Mitchell would
only be able to complete the 2,000 mile mission with additional fuel
tanks. Early in February, two B-25s successfully completed takeoffs
from the aircraft carrier Hornet, proving that it was possible, and
therefore, the mission feasible. More important than the question
of being able to take off from a carrier, however, was the question
of being able to land on one.
Aircraft that land on aircraft carriers do so with a hook attached
to the undercarriage of the fuselage. The hook catches one of a series
of cables on the carrier deck that brings the aircraft to a sudden
halt. The B-25's (and all aircraft not designed for carrier operations
for that matter) tail is not structurally strong enough to withstand
the immense stress of a carrier landing. Anyhow, even if a B-25 was
capable of landing on a carrier, it would be too large to be taken
off the deck after landing, and no other planes would be able to land
after the initial plane.
Because the planes would not be able to return to the ship after
completion of the mission, it seemed that the operation would never
come to fruition. However, it was put forth that the planes could
bomb Japan, and proceed westward to airfields in free China or the
Soviet Union. However, since "the Soviets were neutral vis-a-vis Japan,"
they would not grant permission for the planes to land in Soviet territory.8
And Chiang Kai-shek (rightly) feared reprisals from the Japanese if
the planes would be allowed to land in Chinese territory, and was
accordingly wary to grant permission. To circumvent this, the Americans
lied to Chiang Kai-shek, telling him that the planes were part of
a Lend-Lease package. Only after the planes were airborne and could
not be turned back did the Americans inform him of the true nature
of the incoming planes.
With the general plan in place, attention then turned to the technicalities
and specifics of the operation. First and foremost, the planes and
pilots had to be requisitioned. Twenty-four B-25s were obtained and
shipped to factories for the necessary modifications. To each plane,
a 225-gallon rubber tank, a collapsible 160-gallon rubber tank, and
a 60-gallon tank were added. The addition of these tanks required
modifications to the bomb shackles as well as some other minor modifications.
In addition, the lower gun turret in each plane was removed, and a
simple crosshair sight to facilitate low-level bombing and to keep
the Norden bombsight secret in case of capture replaced the Norden
sight in each plane. A camera was also placed in the rear of some
of the planes to photograph the bomb damage.9
Interestingly, these modifications put the B-25's final weight (complete
with fuel, crew, and bomb load) two thousand pounds over its maximum
load. However, the airspeed created by the movement of the carrier
into the wind provided enough additional lift to overcome this.10
As for the pilots, twenty-four crews of volunteers were selected
from the 17th Bombardment Group stationed in Pendleton, Oregon. The
planes, once modified, and the crews were then transferred to Eglin
Field in Florida for training at the beginning of March. The main
focus of training was to be, for obvious reasons, short-field takeoffs
to simulate actual carrier takeoffs. The crews would also practice
overwater navigation, gunnery, and low-level flight and bombing. Unfortunately,
they had very limited time to train for all of this--so little, in
fact, "that there was no time to instruct crewmen how to bail out."11
Moreover, the crews were being trained in complete secrecy, without
ever knowing the true nature of their mission.
The nature of their mission was to "bomb and fire the industrial
center of Japan," thereby striking a psychological blow at the Japanese.12
To accomplish this, sixteen planes would be loaded with two thousand
pounds of demolition and incendiary bombs. Launching from a carrier
four or five hundred miles off the coast of Japan, the planes would
proceed to bomb military targets in Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe.
The raid would be conducted at night, with the exception of Doolittle
himself, who would arrive at Tokyo near dusk and drop a full load
of incendiary bombs to light the way for the following planes, which
would launch roughly three hours after Doolittle. The planes would
then proceed to friendly fields in China where they would land.
On March 23, 1942, eighteen of the twenty-four planes and crews
were selected as the final complement for the mission. Those eighteen
planes and crews proceeded to Sacramento, where they were put through
mechanical inspection and given final tune-ups. From Sacramento, they
proceeded to San Francisco where, on the night of March 30, sixteen
of the bombers were loaded by crane on to the carrier Hornet. All
eighteen crews would accompany the sixteen bombers, with two of the
crews acting as reserves in case of emergency. All told, the final
group that would actually run the mission would consist of the sixteen
planes, thirty-two pilots, and forty-eight crewmen.
On April 2, 1942, the Hornet (Task Force 16.2) set out from San
Francisco and made way for a rendezvous point with Task Force 16.1,
the ships that would escort the Hornet to the launch point and back
to Pearl Harbor.13 When Task Force
16.1 and Task Force 16.2 united to form Task Force 16, they formed
a considerable force, especially considering the weakened state of
the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Two carriers, the Hornet carrying the bombers,
Enterprise carrying a complement of fighters, dive bombers, and torpedo
bombers in case of an encounter, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser,
eight destroyers, and two supply ships formed the Task Force, under
the command of Admiral Halsey.14
After each force was one day out of port, the men were finally informed
that they were bound for Tokyo.
En route to the rendezvous, both Task Force 16.1 and Task Force
16.2 encountered foul weather. "Fierce storms with high winds, heavy
seas, rain squalls, and poor visibility," racked the ships, and delayed
the meeting twenty-four hours.15
However, the meeting was made on April 13 without loss of life (two
sailors were washed overboard, but were recovered) and without too
great of difficulty. On April 15, Halsey ordered the two supply ships
to refuel the other ships in the Task Force and then hold their position
and wait for either the return of the Task Force or the order to return
to Pearl Harbor.
Amazingly, the weather managed to deteriorate even further, to
the point where on the fifteenth, the eight destroyers in the Task
Force could no longer remain with the carriers and cruisers. They
too were ordered to remain behind, and took up station with the supply
ships. At this point, the Task Force now only consisted of the two
carriers and four cruisers. The absence of the eight destroyers meant
almost certain doom for the six remaining ships in the event of a
naval engagement with the formidable Imperial Japanese Navy, but the
Task Force forged westward anyhow.
Despite the bad weather and absence of the destroyers, things ran smoothly
for the next two days; the task force made decent headway, and morale
remained high. The men attached medals commemorating a 1908 U.S. Navy
visit to Japan to some of the bombs, and wrote such slogans as "I don't
want to set the world on fire - just Tokyo!" on others. Increased tension
was the only visible sign that the task force was sailing deep into the
heart of Japanese controlled waters. By dusk on the seventeenth, final
preparations had been made on the planes--ammunition, fuel, and other
gear loaded, and the planes in place for takeoff. Though twenty-four hours
ahead of schedule (due to a navy miscalculation regarding the International
Date Line), everything was otherwise going as planned. On the eighteenth,
however, the turn of events turned the mood and the plan on its head.
continue to page 2
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Copyright
© 1994-2005 Stephen Payne
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